EDITORIAL

To see the LUMS Student Law Review finally published is a matter of immense pleasure and satisfaction for all of us who have been involved in this project.

The LSLR began as flash in our minds. More than a year ago, we realized a fact something which is as strange as it is true: in a country of more than one hundred and seventy million people, more than a hundred thousand lawyers and thousands of law students, there is not even a single, regularly-published and widely available academic law journal.[1] It is only too obvious that this gap is one of the various reasons for the absence of a vibrant and informed legal discourse in the country.[2] It is this gap in our legal discourse which we at the Review seek to fill.

COMMENT: QAZALBASH WAQF V. CHIEF LAND COMMISSIONER (PLD 1990 SC 99)

I. INTRODUCTION

The Qazalbash Waqf v. Chief Land Commissioner[1] (PLD 1990 SC 99) judgment is one of the most important and influential court judgments ever passed by the superior court of Pakistan. Yet, for all its importance to our jurisprudence, it has not attracted much scholarly critique nor has it generated much public debate. In the few works that do make any mention of it, it has been briefly criticised as the judicial decision which shut the doors of ‘land reform’ in Pakistan.[2] At the most basic level, this description of the outcome of the case is not inaccurate and it is not the purpose of this comment to refute that. But this most basic description should not be treated as the end of the road for critical evaluation. Precedents as important and as complicated as the one being reviewed here deserve to be studied, described and debated again and again, in great detail and from a range of perspectives; only from such detailed, multi-faceted and vibrant legal discourse can better outcomes emerge. What this comment seeks to do is to view the judgment afresh, presenting to the readers a basic overview of this landmark case and its historical background, followed by a somewhat more imaginative interpretation of its possible implications.

THE BEIJING DECLARATION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN, 1995

ZAINAB QURESHI*

“The overall scenario is that in such a deprived and oppressed culture it seems ludicrous to suggest that either sex could be a victor.”
- Jackie Huggins “Aboriginal Women and Women’s Liberation Movement of Australia” (1990)

The 1995 Beijing Declaration of indigenous women was issued by the Indigenous women’s caucus of the NGO Forum of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held from September 4 to 15, 1995. The World Conference consisted of parallel deliberations – some conducted by the official state representatives at Beijing and others conducted by the representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) conducted at Hairou; the latter included participants from almost 110 indigenous women who represented indigenous organizations from over 30 countries (Sillet 63).

EXPLORING POSSIBILITIES OF THE DECOLONIZATION OF LAW: PEOPLE’S LAW AND THE NAXALITE MOVEMENT IN INDIA

MUHAMMAD HAIDER IMTIAZ*

‘Whatever the achievements of Western bourgeois civilization, these are now exhausted. We are on the threshold of reconstructing a new civilization, a more universal, a more humane, civilization. And that cannot be done without defeating and destroying imperialism on all fronts. On the legal front, we have to re-think law and its future rather than simply talk in terms of re-making it. I do not know how, but I do know how not. We cannot continue to accept the value-system underlying the Anglo-American law as unproblematic. The very premises of law need to be interrogated. We cannot continue accepting the Western civilization’s claim to universality. Its universalization owes much to the argument of force rather than the force of argument. We have to rediscover other civilizations and weave together a new tapestry borrowing from different cultures and peoples.’
- Issa G. Shivji, “Law's Empire and Empire's Lawlessness: Beyond the Anglo-American Law”, (2003)

I. INTRODUCTION

‘Colonialism is a practice of domination, which involves the subjugation of one people to another.’ (Kohn) The process of colonization involves subjugation, domination and exploitation of a people, which radically alters the materialities as well as the idealities of its victims.

A RETHINKING OF HUMAN RIGHTS

ASHER ASIF QAZI*

I. INTRODUCTION

Many authors label the preceding century as the age of human rights. The number of human rights seems to be increasing, and with the far-reaching effects of globalization the audience of these rights also seems to be increasing. For many this age of human rights is a blessing, during which universal norms of justice, equity and fairness have spread throughout the world. Others, however, remain skeptical of this ‘newly’ found blessing. These critics project human rights as another form of imperialism which, they claim, is nothing more than a neo-colonial attempt to universalize a dominant ideology all over the world. It is this critique of human rights which will be analyzed in this paper.