THE BEIJING DECLARATION OF INDIGENOUS WOMEN, 1995

ZAINAB QURESHI*

“The overall scenario is that in such a deprived and oppressed culture it seems ludicrous to suggest that either sex could be a victor.”
- Jackie Huggins “Aboriginal Women and Women’s Liberation Movement of Australia” (1990)

The 1995 Beijing Declaration of indigenous women was issued by the Indigenous women’s caucus of the NGO Forum of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held from September 4 to 15, 1995. The World Conference consisted of parallel deliberations – some conducted by the official state representatives at Beijing and others conducted by the representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) conducted at Hairou; the latter included participants from almost 110 indigenous women who represented indigenous organizations from over 30 countries (Sillet 63).
These women formed an indigenous women’s caucus, which conducted daily sessions at the Hairou site in order to formulate a draft declaration to influence the joint Draft Platform of Action – a formal strategic plan guiding the long-term activities of the UN – being formulated through the deliberations being conducted at both Beijing and Hairou. Dissatisfied at the marginalization of their concerns in the Draft Platform of Action, issued at the conclusion of the conference, the caucus released a parallel statement of protest in the form of the 1995 Beijing Declaration of Indigenous women. The Declaration covers the issues of concern to Indigenous peoples around the world: self-determination, land and territories, health, education, human rights violations, violence against women, intellectual property rights, biodiversity, the Human Genome Biodiversity Project, and political participation (Sillet 63).

The Declaration, essentially, challenges the cultural, racial, national, and class- based biases that are engrained in international activism around women's rights – particularly as espoused by “First World Feminists” - through decrying the platform's lack of attention to the impacts that neo-colonialism, structural adjustment, and globalization have on indigenous people's territories, resources, intellectual property, and cultural heritage (Richards 212). One of the central premises of the articulation of protest was that the DPA was an illustration of the attempts of the major Northern states to de-politicise the issue of gender equity, particularly as it relates to the indigenous women. The positing of an essentialised and universal category of “Woman” and the corresponding framing of certain issues as “women’s issues” framed the debate and led to the circumscribing of deliberations and the consequent framing of the DPA to sex-based discrimination. Such hegemonic epistemological categories assume themselves as universal and thus frame the international politico-legal discourse surrounding women, all over the world, and serve to silence alternative and oppositional experiences in the locations of the dominant neo-liberal international legal and political system (as in the case of the UN and the fourth world conference).

The abstraction of “Woman” as a monolithic, universal entity is not based on shared biological essentials, but rather on the basis of sociological and anthropological “universals” formulated through the process of colonialism, which resulted in conquest of epistemological space of the colonized hence leading to the universal imposition of certain cognitive categories and social forms (Mohanty 65, Bhambra 16). The lack of “written” history (in the form of archives, records etc.) was taken by colonizers as “proof” of lack of humanity, historical consciousness and reason in the colonized as opposed to the colonizers. This in turn led to the creation of history as a universal, linear trajectory where change was to occur through known socio-evolutionary periods of transition - starting from the primitive and leading to the modern. Within this history the colonizers were placed as signifiers of the “modern” period while the colonized were the “primitive” (Bhambra 22-24). This in turn, rationalized the period of colonial tutelage as necessary to bring the primitive to a higher period of evolution. Thus, the predominant epistemological discourse of the “colonial world” (defined as psychologies of colonizers and colonized produced through interactions of particular historical conditions) considers history as a known evolutionary process already undergone by the colonizers, and now simply “to be reproduced mechanically or otherwise” by the colonized “with a local content” (Bhambra 24). It is this conception of history as an ethno/Eurocentric, known, universal, linear trajectory of evolution that forms the basis of the appropriation of experiences of all women within the monolithic categorization of “Woman” within the hegemonic neo-liberal discourse. “First World” feminists (who dominate the international legal discourse pertaining to women) posit “woman” as a cross cultural category based on common interests and sameness in experiences of oppression against a universal system of patriarchy. They base their representation of the “Other “i.e. the “Third World Woman” by situating themselves at the highest level of “evolution” and the latter at the early “primitive” stage (as victims of oppressive and archaic cultures) and hence justify their treatment as “objects” for the implementation of neo-liberal policies (of “development” and “modernity”) to advance them to higher stages of liberation and advancement (Mohanty 65). Thus, in this sense, the DPA distorted and essentialized Indigenous women’s identities by depriving them of agency and naturalizing their marginalization, setting them up as “… targets for ‘development’ interventions” (Parisi 8). Similarly one of the DPA’s central assertions was that,

“Eradication of poverty based on sustained economic growth, social development, environmental protection and social justice requires the involvement of women in economic and social development and equal opportunities and the full and equal participation of women and men as agents and beneficiaries of people-centered sustainable development.”

Similarly, it stated amongst its strategic objects and actions that,

“Particularly in developing countries, the productive capacity of women should be increased through access to capital, resources, credit, land, technology, information, technical assistance and training so as to raise their income and improve nutrition, education, health care and status within the household. The release of women's productive potential is pivotal to breaking the cycle of poverty so that women can share fully in the benefits of development and in the products of their own labour.”

Such abstractions (and their genocidal implications) essentially serve to reinforce the existing structures of domination (“First World”) by facilitating the framing of dialogue in a way that fails to challenge issues of racial, environmental, civil, political, economic and cultural inequities (Nayar 10; Corpuz). At one of the NGO workshops at Huairou, Ayala Lasso, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, admitted that there had been orders from the UN General Assembly that human rights issues included in the DPA should be depoliticized (Corpuz). In this vein, Chimni contends that International Human Rights Organizations (IHROs) perpetuate dominance of the Northern States and Trans-capitalist class since the language of liberal human rights serves to “ deflect radical social movements into more official channels that can be controlled through procedural formalities” (11). Similarly, Marxists argue that by naturalizing social arrangements and institutions, rights-based politics lends itself to reformism, draws attention and resources away from the possibility of radical social transformation, and ultimately protects bourgeois interests. They emphasize that generalized statements of rights are easily manipulated to particular ends; a focus on achieving equal rights simplifies power relations and thus "tacitly reinforces the basic organization of society" (Richards).

The Beijing Declaration challenges such epistemological colonization of legal discourse by challenging the appropriation of the experiences and identities of Indigenous women within the abstraction of universal category of “Woman” and the corresponding classification and appropriation of their issues as “women issues”. The authors of the declaration frame their articulation by rejecting these conceptual constructs and defining themselves and their experience/ “history” in terms of their political realities of solidarity. Their definition of themselves is neither external nor in the form of an abstraction with pre-defined parameters but rather it is in the form of a lived consciousness. It is not imposed on them but rather created and negotiated by themselves in terms of their shared “justice cause” (Nayar 15). Paragraph 1 of the Declaration states: “The Earth is our mother. From her we get our life, and our ability to live… Women, all females, are a manifestation of Mother Earth in human form.” Similarly paragraph 5 states,

“We, the women of the original peoples of the world have struggled actively to defend our rights to self-determination and to our territories which have been invaded and colonized by powerful nations and interests. We have been and are continuing to suffer from multiple oppressions; as Indigenous peoples, as citizens of colonized and neo-colonial countries, as women, and as members of the poorer classes of society...”

Furthermore, paragraph 9 states: “It is imperative for us, as indigenous peoples...” The imposition of the pre-defined linear trajectory of oppression of the universal “Woman” is, thus, rejected, and the authors claim the right to define themselves in terms of the materialities of multiple experiences of oppression they face – as women, as indigenous peoples , as poor and as citizens of colonized and neo-colonized countries of the world. Thus, the legitimacy of their claims is based not on conformity with “abstract constructions of a priori truth” and procedural formalities as required by the quintessential “legal form” of Western liberal law (as the essentialization of Weberian formal rationality), but rather derives from the relevance of their politics to the “peoples” they refer to.

In this sense, the indigenous women frame their claims through a “politics of intersectionality”. The concept of intersectionality constitutes a theoretical and methodological approach to a non-essentialized identity politics and provides a basis for justice cause action. “Intersectional approaches start from the analytical premise that people’s identities, i.e., gender, race, class, sexuality, nation, etc., are not mutually exclusive , but rather multiple, layered, and inter-related and, as such, produce unique and specific experiences that are not easily essentialized” (Parisi 2). Intersectional approaches go beyond simplistic binary gender-based analysis, which examines only one relationship of power (universal system of patriarchy assumed by “First World”), to highlight how social categories “… gain meaning and power by reinforcing and referencing each other”. Indigenous women, claim to experience violence and discrimination based on multiple identities, and thus use the notion of ‘intersectionality’ to locate themselves in their “families, clans, communities or nations, host states, and the transnational and in the international arena” (Paris 2-3). They argue that the structural gender inequality is inextricably linked to other forms of inequality such as racism, capitalism and colonialism, and hence can only be understood through its interactions with the latter forms.

Therefore, by their rejection of the frame of “Woman” and its corresponding assumption of a universal sameness of experience/oppression, the indigenous women of the Beijing Declaration develop their own framework and language for understanding themselves which allows them (and their constituencies) to reclaim the aspects of their cultures and histories lost within the predominant hegemonic neo-liberal legal discourse. For example, the Mapuche women of Chile reject the monolithic western construct of “Woman” and the conception of gender to explain relations between men and women within their culture. Rather they explain the relationship to be “governed by the principles of complementarity and equilibrium”. They, like the Beijing Declaration, argue that sexism within their culture is a result of colonialism (material and epistemic) and thus reconstruction of their ancestral values of equilibrium and complementarity between men and women can be used to benefit women’s status. Thus, the Beijing Declaration represents an articulation of a re-appropriation and reclaiming of the rights by the indigenous women to claim or reclaim their “Truth” and narrate their histories and futures (in contrast to the history of universal trajectory of transitions) from the dominant colonial processes and sites of the hegemonic legal order.

The Declaration challenges the DPA’s framing by employing an intersectional analysis that materially and historically links the “issues of globalization and neo-imperialism, the legacies of colonization, and gender inequality.” It thus highlights the problem of incorporating Indigenous women into neo-liberal development schemes that threaten the self-determination and cultural integrity of Indigenous peoples and thus contribute to the marginalization of Indigenous women (Parisi 7-8). Article 16 of the Declaration states,

“… [The Draft Platform's] recommended" strategic objectives and actions focus on ensuring women's equal access and full participation in decision-making, equal status , equal pay and on integrating and mainstreaming gender perspectives and analysis. These objectives are hollow and meaningless if the inequality between nations, races, classes, and genders are not challenged at the same time. Equal pay and equal status on the so-called First World is made possible because of the perpetuation of a development model which is not only unsustainable but causes the increasing violation of the human rights of women, indigenous peoples, and nations elsewhere….”

Similarly Article 10 and 11 state,

“... [DPA] identifies "the persistent and increasing burden of poverty" as the number one critical concern. It acknowledges that "most of the goals of the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies...have not been achieved." It also acknowledged that "in the past decade the number of women living in poverty has increased disproportionately to the number of men.

11. However, it does not acknowledge that this poverty is caused by the same powerful nations and interests who have colonized us and are continuing to recolonize, homogenize, and impose their economic growth development model and monocultures on us. It does not present a coherent analysis of why is it that the goals of "equality, development, and peace," become more elusive to women each day in spite of three UN conferences on women since 1975. While it refers to structural adjustment programs (SAP), it only talks about mitigating its negative impacts, not questioning the basic framework undergirding SAPs. It even underscores the importance of trade liberalization and access to open and dynamic markets, which to us, pose the biggest threat to our rights to our territories, resources, intellectual and cultural heritage.”

Hence, the Indigenous women also made clear the limitations of the international human rights discourse based on individual liberalism and central to the “First World” feminist agenda of “women’s rights as human rights” that asks them to trade off their rights as Indigenous peoples in order to claim rights as individual women that are predicated on the principle of sex-based discrimination. The juridical individual that is central to the legal form of Western liberal law – and essential to its internal self-definition of normative closure and logical coherence - although used as a basis of maintaining law as seemingly general and universal system of social control is in fact a political practice - an abstract right bearing subject of the liberal private-property system introduced by the deceit and violence of colonialism- and it serves to block discussion of the “customary” , “traditional” and collective rights of indigenous peoples such as autonomous self-government, control over territory and natural resources (material and intellectual), and preservation of cultural traditions, religions and languages ( Norrie 262-3; Richards 204). The international state-dominated liberal legal order accords priority to the territorial integrity of states and thus silences the collective claims of the indigenous by making them into “citizens” of the nations states – and hence “ equal” to all other citizens (Richards 204). This was precisely the pattern imbued by the Draft Platform of Action. Based on their multiple identities and locations as women and as indigenous peoples, the articulation of their rights enshrined in the Declaration constitutes of a combination of individual rights as and collective and communal rights; the indigenous women seek to theorize their individual rights without abandoning their collective and communal interests (Richards 211). (The “individual” here is not to be taken as the juridical subject of Western liberal law – rather it represents the intersectional identities claimed by the Indigenous women in the Declaration). The rights articulated are based predominantly on the aim of a “collective” liberation of indigenous peoples, and those pertaining to issues of indigenous women are conceptualized as part of this larger struggle. For example the right to education and literacy of indigenous women are framed (in article 25) as part of the encompassing right of the indigenous peoples to “inter-cultural and bilingual education which respects Indigenous cosmologies, promotes non-sexist formative education which puts women and men in touch with the land.”

The Declaration claims for the indigenous people, the status as “peoples” under international law, and hence appropriates to them the central right to self-determination, which forms the basis of their collective struggle. International law at the time of the passing of the Declaration did not recognize the status of the indigenous as “peoples” and hence their right to self determination as imbibed in the UN Charter and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They were delegated to the positions of minorities and tribes. They claim this right, firstly, on the basis of universality of the legal form of human rights and secondly, and primarily, based on its relevance and necessity to the political realities of their existence as a group. The latter includes substantive claims of their unique indigenous cosmo-vision, special relationship with land (Mother Earth), unique ancestral and cultural values, and knowledge, science and technologies and spirituality. Thus, this amounts to their interrogation of the claim of the First World’s law of a universal objectivity to the “Truth” and the claiming of their own right to decide the legitimacy of their substantive claims.

Criticism is raised against the use of the human-rights discourse by the declaration on the basis of its reinforcing the existing structures of inequalities. This use of the human rights discourse by the Indigenous women is indicative of their appropriation of this concept to serve their purposes in their varying locations and identities. While human rights may have emerged from historically specific circumstances, the appropriation of the discourse by the indigenous women through the claiming of power over the definition of its subject demonstrates the ability of human rights discourse to accommodate multiple alternatives and ideologies. An example of this ability for accommodation is the reconciliation of the individual rights of indigenous women as “women” and the collective rights of the indigenous people. Such a feat that would not have been achieved through the liberal discourse of human rights which would have supported only the rights based on a singular identity and location (individual rights as women) whilst silencing the rest (collective rights as indigenous). Thus such decolonization of the concept of human rights creates a human rights discourse that has emancipatory potential for radical social movements challenging the predominant global order.

However, whilst the “Beijing Declaration for indigenous women” re-appropriates the narratives of the history and futures of the indigenous women from the dominant sites and processes of the hegemonic neo-colonial world order to the women themselves, it falls short of reappropriating “the right to act” to initiate “grass roots democratic action of and for” their articulation of law in the same way (Nayar). The rights that the declaration gives to the indigenous women are addressed as demands to the States and the United Nations agencies. For example, Article 4 reads,

“We stand in unity behind this 1995 Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women which is the fruit of our collective efforts to understand the world and our situation as indigenous women, critique the Draft Platform for Action, and articulate our demands to the international communities, the governments and the NGO’s.”

Similarly Article 18 states,

“That all governments and international non-governmental and governmental organizations recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to self determination, and enshrine the historical, political, social , cultural , economic, and religious rights of the indigenous peoples in their constitutions and legal systems.”

This transfers the “Power” of political practice of and for this law to the existing structures of domination within the existing international politico-legal discourse (“First World”) and, in turn, reinforces the existing structural inequalities of power. This point is further corroborated by the fact that the Declaration was formulated as an attempt to influence the deliberations of the State and NGO representatives surrounding the drafting of the Draft Platform of Action at the United Nations World Conference for Women. Thus even though the Declaration represents an articulation of a “reconceptualised decolonised sovereignty” in terms of its being an embodiment of transfer of power to the people (indigenous women) to “judge” realities and violations inflicted upon them and the transfer of power to author law and define its corresponding structures and social relationships , it does not embody/articulate an entitlement of control over decision-making and judgment to the people or over the effectuation of the implementation of their alternative perspectives of reality (Nayar). It is within such a context that David Kennedy argued that the,

“Professionalization of the human rights movement has meant a kind of depoliticisation, the sudden emergence of an elaborate presence pulling local elites away from their base, or consigning them to the status of local informants, attention turning like sunflowers to Geneva, New York to the centre, to the Commission, to the work of resolutions and reports. And away from political practice on the ground” (Menon 225).

Thus the Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women, 1995 represents an attempt at a decolonialized approach through the re-appropriation of the legal form – juridical abstractions- of the predominant Western liberal law in order to accommodate contesting identities and locations. Through the articulation of a law based on an alternative world view, the Declaration contests the claim of universal objective Truth that Western liberal legal discourse espouses. However, this is not to say that Declaration itself is not based on any form; its form is derived from the underlying norms of the indigenous world view, such as the norms governing the indigenous relationship with Mother Earth, those governing gender relationships and the transfer of intellectual property and knowledge. Thus, both the Declaration and the Western liberal legal system represent different combinations of legal form/content constituencies. The legitimacy of former is based on the political realities of its constituents and the relevance of its substantive claims to them, whereas that of the latter is based on epistemic colonialism through deceit and violence.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Corpuz, Victoria T. Depoliticising Gender in Beijing. Welcome to Third World Network (TWN). 02 Dec. 2009. .

Menon, Nivedita. Recovering Subversion, Feminist Politics Beyond the Law. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004.

Mohanty, Chandra T. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” Feminist Review. 30 (1988): 61-88.

Nayar, Jayan. “People's Law: Decolonising Legal Imagination.” Law, Social Justice and Global Development. (2007): 2-29.

Norrie, Alan. “From Law to Popular Justice : Beyond Antinomialism.” Social and Legal Studies. 5.3 (1996).

Parisi, Laura, and Jeff Corntassel. “In Pursuit of Self-Determination: Indigenous women's Challenges to Traditional Diplomatic Spaces.” Canadian Foreign Policy. 1-18.

Richards, Patricia. “The Politics of Gender, Human Rights, and Being Indigenous in Chile.” Gender and Society. 19.2 (2005): 199-220.

Sillet, Mary. “Ensuring Indigenous Women’s Voices are Heard.” Canadian Women Studies. 16.3 (2009).

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